Alek's Blog
Diagram: how HAProxy Unified Gateway builds the HAProxy configuration

Extending HAProxy Unified Gateway: backend config snippets and the failure modes I found

What HAProxy Unified Gateway needed to run the cloudauth filter: a config_snippet patch, a JSON bug only a real cluster showed, and four controller issues.

Extending HAProxy Unified Gateway: backend config snippets and the failure modes I found
Maximum concurrent requests per server and algorithm in the 2019 power of two test, rebuilt in 2026 at 2 cores

HAProxy leastconn vs power of two: the 2019 test rebuilt in 2026

HAProxy load balancing benchmark: the 2019 power of two test rebuilt on Kubernetes, plus gRPC on JVMs. leastconn holds up, peak EWMA won only in a narrow case.

HAProxy leastconn vs power of two: the 2019 test rebuilt in 2026
Diagram: the Peak EWMA test bed on OVH MKS, with h2load, two HAProxy instances and 32 servers

Peak EWMA in HAProxy: from a Lua prototype to a core patch

Peak EWMA load balancing for HAProxy: a Lua prototype, a test bed on Kubernetes, a small core patch, and what the measurements taught about random draws.

Peak EWMA in HAProxy: from a Lua prototype to a core patch
Diagram: the agent reads workload data, the prompt carries everything read so far to the gateway; normally it reaches the local model, at a limit it can cross the jurisdiction boundary to an external model

Sovereign AI Agents: Context Limits Decide Where Your Data Goes

An AI agent reaches the limits of its model sooner or later. Whether its data then leaves your own infrastructure is a decision that has to be made on purpose.

Sovereign AI Agents: Context Limits Decide Where Your Data Goes
Blog post cover image

Sovereign AI Agents: How My Own Fallback Can Send Requests to US Providers

Building an AI agent on a frontier model is easy, operating it sovereignly is its own discipline. My LLM series on OVH MKS shows where sovereignty quietly leaks.

Sovereign AI Agents: How My Own Fallback Can Send Requests to US Providers
Diagram: agent a reaches llm x and tools only through gateway a and a tool proxy, direct egress is blocked, an external llm y is reachable only for approved data classes

Sovereign AI Agents: Routing, Egress, and Agent Permissions in Practice

Three control surfaces for a sovereign AI agent on OVH MKS: model routing and fallback in LiteLLM, egress under Istio Ambient, and tool permissions of the agent.

Sovereign AI Agents: Routing, Egress, and Agent Permissions in Practice